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15 December 1959

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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



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	CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN	
	15 December 1959	25)
	DAILY BRIEF	
	I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC	
	Communist China - Nepal: Tibetans acting for the Chinese Communists have been trying for the past two months to persuade border tribes in Nepal that they owe allegiance	
οK	A late October clash between Chinese forces and Khamba rebels near the Sino-Nepalese border suggests that Chinese troops are moving westward along the undemarcated frontier, increasing the possibility of incursions into Nepalese territory. There is concern in Nepal, which last September unsuccessfully sought written Chinese guarantees of the "traditional" boundary, over reports of border crossings. (Page 1) (Map)	25X1 25X1
	II. ASIA-AFRICA	25X1

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III. THE WEST

Inter-American Conference: Ecuadoran Foreign Minister Tobar has told the press that the 11th Inter-American conference, set for Quito on 1 February, may have to be postponed until after Ecuador's presidential election in June. The declaration was cleared with President Ponce, who has heretofore insisted that the meeting would be held as scheduled, and apparently has the approval of the Brazilian foreign minister, with whom Tobar recently conferred in Rio. Meanwhile, former Ecuadoran President Galo Plaza, who has considerable prestige in Latin America, has also recommended postponement. These statements will probably encourage Peru and Venezuela to continue their effort to delay the conference—a move which already has the sympathy or support of some other Latin American nations. (Page 3)

LATE ITEM

*USSR-Geneva Talks: The package proposal on composition and voting procedures in the control commission and staffing of the inspection posts, presented at the nuclear test cessation talks by the Soviet delegate on 14 December, is a further move to demonstrate the USSR's desire for an early settlement of outstanding issues. Moscow probably hopes this offer to compromise on political issues will increase pressure on the West to make concessions in the technical talks on the detection of underground tests which would lead to an agreed report by the experts. The Soviet leaders probably believe that agreement by the experts would forestall any Western pressure for a limited treaty which would exclude underground tests. While the new proposal drops previous insistence on three power unanimity over budgetary matters, it provides for a two-thirds majority vote in a commission composed of three Western states, three bloc, and one neutral, which would enable Moscow to block any decision in this area.

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
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DAILY BRIEF

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

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Chinese Communist Activity Along Sino-Nepalese Border	
Communist China may be stepping up its subversive activities along the Sino-Nepalese border. Tibetans acting for the Chinese have been trying for the past two months to persuade tribal minorities across the Nepal border that they owe allegiance to Tibet, Chinese propaganda among Nepal's border minorities will not be too effective, since many of them regard Tibetans as inferior despite their close cultural ties with Tibet.	25X 25X
A clash between Chinese forces and Khamba rebels, in which the latter were defeated, occurred in late October at Dzongkha near the Sino-Nepalese border. The area of the clash suggests that Chinese troops are moving westward along the undemarcated frontier, increasing the possibility of incursions into Nepalese territory. there are from 3,000 to 4,500 Khamba and Tibetan rebels between Dzongkha and the Nepalese salient of Mustang to the west. There have also been reports of Chinese infiltration across the western end of the Sino-Nepalese border near Limi.	25X1 25X1
These reports have caused concern in Nepal, which last September unsuccessfully sought written Chinese guarantees of the "traditional" boundary. The Nepalese Army believes that such areas as Mustang, lying north of the main Himalayan range, would be the first affected by Chinese infiltration.	
The Nepalese Defense Minister charged on 15 December that a heavy concentration of Chinese Communist troops is "within a few days' march" from the border.	25X´
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III. THE WEST

Ecuador May Call for Postponement of Eleventh	
Inter-American Conference	

The Ecuadoran Government has apparently abandoned its opposition to postponement of the Eleventh Inter-American Conference, scheduled for Quito on 1 February. Foreign Minister Tobar told the press on 13 December that Ecuador would accept a later date if the success of the conference so demanded, and that if the conference were postponed the new date should be after the presidential elections in June. His announcement was cleared with President Ponce and apparently has the approval of the Brazilian foreign minister, with whom Tobar recently conferred in Rio.

Domestic opposition was apparently one of the factors behind the government's decision. Former President Galo Plaza, who has considerable prestige in Latin America and who is a presidential contender, recently recommended postponement and called for the introduction of the inflammatory Ecuador-Peru boundary dispute when the meeting is held. Former President Velasco, another presidential aspirant, has also called for inclusion of the boundary dispute on the conference agenda. Tobar has made two public statements—highly unpopular in Ecuador—that his government would not introduce this topic, apparently in an effort to keep Peru from carrying out its threat to boycott the meeting.

Tobar's press statement will probably encourage Peru and Venezuela to continue their effort to delay the conference—a move which appears to have the growing support or sympathy of several Latin American countries, including the Dominican Republic, Paraguay, and Colombia, and possibly Cuba and Mexico.

Regional Communists, who have been working to delay or disrupt the conference, may claim a victory if the postponement is effected and will have time to better organize their subversive and propaganda activities against a later meeting. On the other)

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hand, a delay of the conference may avoid the political tension and unrest now prevalent in Ecuador and the current extremist feelings in Peru and Ecuador over the boundary dispute, and will provide time for some relaxation of tension among various Latin American countries over disarmament and authoritarian regimes.

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Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Director, Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization

Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

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The Director

National Indications Center

The Director

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